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ABSTRACT
 is paper consists of three parts. First we focus on four theoretical perspectives of crime 
reduction and consider the implications of the longitudinal study by Soothill et al.1 ese 
‘paradigms’ relate to parental child-rearing methods; structural factors of the family during 
adolescence; geographical segregation; and individual resource deficits. ey are considered 
risk factors for first-time convictions for shopli"ing, burglary and violence. Each offence 
type is considered separately.
 e second part focuses on the debate about ‘why crime rates fell’ in many developed coun-
tries and the type of explanations put forward. e main authors considered are Conklin,2 
Levitt3 and Zimring.4 We point to the remarkable contrast between the factors discussed in 
the first part of the paper and the factors discussed by these authors who emphasise, among 
others, the importance of an increased prison population and an increase in the number of 
police officers.
 e final part of the paper connects the different sets of results presented in the first two 
parts. We maintain that the pivotal issue is whether one can develop a society in which all 
persons feel that they have a stake and, thus, develop internal controls to resist crime. e 
development of more prisons and more intrusive policing – measures of external controls – 
is a sad reflection of a failure to do this.
* Keith Soothill is Emeritus Professor of Social Research, Lancaster University, UK, and Brian Francis is Professor 
of Social Statistics, Lancaster University, UK.
2INTRODUCTION
 is paper consists of three parts in considering the issue of crime reduction. First, we focus 
on theoretical perspectives of crime reduction and then we engage in the debate about ‘Why 
crime rates fell’ in many Western countries. e final part tries to connect what seem to be 
rather different sets of results presented in the first two parts. 
Elsewhere5 we have stressed how over the past century or so, criminology has been the cru-
cible for generating various theories about criminal behaviour. ere has been an important 
tradition in developing perspectives that are directly relevant to the issue of crime reduction. 
Scholars such as Hope6 and Kahn7 have tried to put some order into the tremendous range 
of perspectives which have special relevance to crime reduction. is paper considers four 
paradigms derived from this body of work: a focus on parental child-rearing methods; a fo-
cus on structural factors relating to the family during adolescence; the notion that criminal 
behaviour is linked to localities/neighbourhoods; and, finally, a focus on the resource deficits 
of individuals. 
Our own recent work8 assesses which of these perspectives or paradigms is the most impor-
tant if one is trying to reduce first-time offending for specific offences. We use Denmark as 
our social laboratory as that country has a particularly rich source of administrative data 
which has enabled us to test which of the paradigms are likely to be the most effective in 
reducing crime in a country. 
 is last phrase, ‘in a country’, is crucial, for we are not confident that the results in one 
country necessarily transfer to the experience of other countries. In other words, the social 
and cultural contexts of different countries may also be pivotal in thinking about crime 
reduction. What is appropriate in one country may not be appropriate in another. Never-
theless, the experience of one country may still be helpful in providing clues as to the way 
forward in another country. It provides a way of thinking about crime reduction. 
 e second part of the paper considers a different tradition that again has a long history, but 
has come to the fore in the last two decades as the discussion about the apparently falling 
crime rates in the Western world has come to public notice. Here, the focus is on what we 
can do to deviants in terms of social control – that is, what are the effects of more policing, 
what if we imprison more offenders and so on. In other words, this discourse is much more 
about the social response to crime than about the characteristics and, indeed, the problems 
of the offenders themselves. Of course, the two discourses are not quite as separate as indi-
cated and there may be some overlap. Journalists and politicians from time to time deplore 
the so-called break-up of the family which relates to child-rearing patterns, while calling 
for more police to deal with public disorder caused by youngsters roaming the streets late 
at night. Nevertheless, one can analytically distinguish between these two rather separate 
traditions. e third and final part of the paper considers what the connections are, if any, 
between these two approaches to crime reduction and whether it is more appropriate to 
identify connections rather than conflict between the two traditions.
Perspectives of crime reduction: lessons from Denmark
Our work9 has focused on the following four major and well-known paradigms for crime 
reduction:
3t Relating to parental child-rearing methods
t Relating to structural factors relating to the family during adolescence
t Relating to localities/neighbourhoods
t Relating to individual resource deficits
A crucial issue is whether these apparently competing paradigms make specific or inde-
pendent contributions to the explanation of criminal behaviour and, thus, to crime reduc-
tion. Understanding the relationships between the various paradigms helps to identify the 
most appropriate focus in attempting to reduce crime. 
In theorising about crime there has been a tendency to consider the onset of general of-
fending behaviour. We contend that the start of each of the forms of criminal activity may 
have different precursors. In our study we chose to focus upon three types of crime – violent 
offences, shopli"ing, and burglary – which have widespread prevalence. ey are essentially 
crimes open to all in the sense that they can be committed by anyone – unlike, say, embez-
zlement (where employment is a prerequisite) or drink-driving (where access to a car is a 
prerequisite). With no such structural constraints, the interest is whether the various para-
digms have the same explanatory power for each of these three offences. In short, are there 
different precipitating factors for the onset of these three offences? 
We need to stress that focusing on risk factors has its problems.10 For example, some risk 
factors (for example, parental substance abuse, child-in-care) are comparatively infrequent. 
 erefore, it takes large samples to study the associations in order to disentangle potential 
confounding effects. For this reason, national birth cohorts that provide large numbers to 
analyse are particularly helpful. In our earlier paper we probed a national cohort of males 
born in 1980 and who were registered and living in Denmark on 1 January 1994; this cohort 
was followed up to the end of 2005. Hence, it excludes all males born in Denmark in 1980 
but who emigrated or died prior to the ‘census date’ of 1 January 1994. However, the series 
includes males born in 1980 who immigrated into the country before 1994. For this study 
national administrative registers with information based on each individual’s contact with 
public services, together with their parents and other family members, were linked together 
by the use of a unique personal identity number.11 
We identified three potentially confounding variables – gender, Danish citizenship and prior 
convictions – which correlate with both the outcome variables and the paradigm risk factors 
and which needed to be controlled for. We controlled for gender by limiting the study to 
males.12 e latter two were controlled for by including them in the statistical models, but 
they do not have a risk factor interpretation as these variables cannot be used for deter-
mining crime reduction policies. Age was controlled for by the use of a specific statistical 
method – discrete time Cox modelling – which fits a separate parameter for each age.
 e outcome factors were the first-time conviction of the three offences of interest – violent 
offences, shopli"ing, and burglary. Analyses were carried out using the total national birth 
cohort, which includes 29 944 males and their parents.13 Among those born in the year 1980, 
the number of males who by the end of 2005 were convicted of shopli"ing was 1 989, those 
convicted of burglary was 1 324, while 1 901 were convicted of violence. For the crime of 
shopli"ing, the numbers may seem low but the focus here is on convictions – lesser crimes, 
such as shopli"ing, are likely to have court diversionary procedures, such as cautions. For 
each offence, the occasion of their first conviction for that offence is considered. Convicted 
males could be members of more than one of these three series.
4 e statistical method used – a form of discrete time Cox analysis - allows individual 
changes in risk factors over the life course to be assessed.14 Here we present some examples 
showing the relationship between the risk factors and the paradigms. So, for example, child 
abuse or neglect is shown as a variable relevant to Paradigm 1 (relating to parental child 
rearing methods), while ‘didn’t pass basic schooling level’ is a variable directly relevant to 
Paradigm 4 (relating to individual resource deficits). 
In fact, although a rich dataset, the availability of appropriate data is always a constraint. 
Hence, some of the paradigms are represented by a fuller list of risk factors than others – for 
instance, Paradigm 1 had ten risk factors, but Paradigm 2 had only five risk factors. Hence, 
the available risk factors may not fully reflect the virtues of a particular paradigm and so one 
cannot too readily pronounce the demise of a particular paradigm.
 e following is a summary of results:
t All the four paradigms examined seemed to make a contribution towards explaining 
crime and criminal behaviour in Denmark. 
t Some risk factors seemed to have stronger links with particular offences. So, for ex-
ample, under the ‘parental child rearing’ paradigm, ‘domestic violence’ has a stronger 
link to violence; ‘children being in care’ has a stronger link with burglary; and ‘family 
separation’ has a stronger link with shopli"ing. Why this seems to be the case is not 
clear from the analysis, but it does suggest that different variables may influence the 
development of certain kinds of offending behaviour.
Table 1 The relationship of risk factors and paradigms
Risk factors Paradigms
1 2 3 4
Social background
Parental substance abuse X
Parental mental illness X
Domestic violence X
Parental suicidal behaviour X
Child abuse or neglect X
Family background






5Educational qualifications of parents
Mother has no vocational qualification X
Father has no vocational qualification X
Parental employment and poverty
Parental unemployment > 21 weeks X
Poverty (<40% of median income) X
Parental disability pension X
Disadvantaged area
Disadvantaged area X
Rented housing (not self-owner) X
Individual resources
Unemployment > 21 weeks X
Didn’t pass basic schooling level X
Not in process of training or education X
Not graduated X






Paradigm 1: Parental child-rearing methods
Paradigm 2: Structural factors relating to the family during adolescence
Paradigm 3: Neighbourhood characteristics
Paradigm 4: Individual resource deficits
 e advocates of these various paradigms can take heart from the fact that all can be shown 
to make some contribution to the explanation of criminal behaviour and, thus, to crime 
reduction. However, the point that some paradigms may explain more than others is crucial 
in discussing strategies for effecting crime reduction. In short, there is likely to be more 
widespread benefit in focusing on structural issues within a society which have widespread 
impact (such as unemployment and the lack of vocational qualifications) rather than the 
more individual deficits (such as a psychiatric disorder or even drug addiction) that may 
affect fewer people.
We carried out a counterfactual analysis (for example, Canache et al15) to try to quantify how 
many of the number of first time offenders of a particular type (for instance, 1 989 shopli"-
ers, 1 324 burglars, or 1 901 violent men) are ‘caused’ by a given risk factor. is approach 
is controversial but it does provide an estimated reduction in the numbers becoming an 
offender of a particular type (that is, of shopli"ing, burglary or violence) if a given risk fac-
tor is assumed not to be present and assuming that the relationship is directly causal. Table 2 
6provides some examples indicating that, if, for instance, ‘domestic violence’ was eliminated, 
while all other background characteristics remained constant, then the outcome would 
have the greatest impact on crimes of violence. In contrast, if being in care (that is, children 
who are the responsibility of the state in terms of their child care) was eliminated, then the 
outcome would have the greatest impact on the offence of burglary. However, these reduc-
tions are comparatively minor compared with the impact of eliminating the variable ‘not 
graduated’ where the reduction numbers seem potentially huge and which seems especially 
relevant to the offence, so eliminating around one-half of the violence offenders. It needs to 
be recognised that the causality here is especially suspect as individuals graduating are likely 
to have more personal resources – which are not represented in the model – than those not. 
Table 2 Examples of direct counterfactual reductions in crime when certain 
risk factors are eliminated
Risk factors Direct counterfactual reduction in offenders for specific offences
Shopli"ing Burglary Violence
Domestic violence 89 79 148
Child in care 145 202 66
Family separation 380 261 381
Not graduated 647 831 985
Total first convicted 1 989 1 324 1 901
 e counterfactual approach is by no means watertight, but gives valuable insights, provid-
ing a guide as to what seems worth concentrating on in order to achieve widespread reduc-
tions in the crime rate. However, ours is not a popular conclusion for at least two reasons. 
Firstly, there needs to be the recognition that there is no ‘easy fix’ or ‘magic bullet’ which is 
on offer to reduce crime. Secondly, focusing on structural issues within society – which we 
argue would have the greatest impact on crime reduction – are potentially more costly to 
implement economically than focusing on individual needs with some limited psychological 
interventions. 
So what happens in terms of explanations when a country genuinely seems to have a reduc-
tion in crime rates? What are the explanations called upon? What are the reasons posited? 
 at is the focus of the second part of this paper. In moving to this new focus, we also 
change our examination from convicted offenders to police recorded crime. 
The debate about ‘why crime rates fell’ in the United States and Canada
It is not just one country that has recently experienced a fall in crime rates – the crime rates 
in many countries appear to have fallen. We use the word ‘appear’, for it could be that people 
have lost faith in the criminal justice system and are simply not reporting crimes to the 
authorities. If this happens, then there is an apparent fall in the crime measured by official 
statistics. However, while that certainly can happen, it seems an unlikely explanation in this 
case. e phenomenon of falling crime rates seems too widespread. Many countries are 
reporting a fall in crime rates and, specifically, several are pointing to a fall in the homicide 
7rate, which is usually considered to be a more reliable measure than most crime indices and 
also tends to be used as a measure of the stability of a country. First, however, what is the 
evidence of a fall in crime rates?
A fall in crime rates?
Not unusually, international interest in this topic was sparked by events in the United States. 
It has been stressed by many commentators that during the 1990s the United States expe-
rienced the most dramatic decline in the rate of crime per 100 000 inhabitants since World 
War II. is fall in crime rates had not been predicted but there is little doubt that it hap-
pened. According to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report,16 from 1990 to 2000 the rate of crime 
per 100 000 inhabitants in all of the seven main categories of crime decreased dramatically 
in the United States, ranging from 23% in the case of larceny to 44% in the case of aggra-
vated assault. Homicide rates plunged by 43% from the peak in 1991 to 2001, reaching the 
lowest levels in 35 years.17 Commentators such as Zimring18 even suggested that these num-
bers may be an underestimate of the decrease in crime rates because the household survey 
carried out by the Bureau of Justice Statistics estimated general decreases between 44% and 
65%. 
 e fall prompted much interest at both academic and public levels. Two important books 
– John E Conklin’s Why crime rates fell19 and Franklin E Zimring’s "e great American crime 
decline20 – have probably provided the most sustained analysis of the situation in terms of 
general crime rates. Both Conklin and Zimring focus on the United States, but particularly 
on New York City, where the decline was twice as great as the national average. In addition, 
an influential article by Steven Levitt was published in the Journal of Economic Perspectives.21 
Conklin’s and Levitt’s accounts focus almost exclusively on the United States, while Zimring 
notes the equally dramatic decreases in crime rates in Canada. In Canada, during the same 
period, all of the seven main categories of crime saw dramatic rate decreases, ranging from 
13% in the case of robbery to 62% in the case of serious assault. Zimring’s focus on Canada 
is important as his comparison of Canada and the United States proves crucial in challeng-
ing some arguments based on the United States alone. However, the narrow focus on North 
America (that is, the United States and Canada) only sidelines the scale of the decline in 
the Western world (England and Wales, for instance, experienced almost a decade of falling 
crime although the start date of the decline came later, from the mid-1990s). e insistence 
on focusing on North America also undermines the recognition that explanations pertinent 
to the United States may not have a wider application. As Zimring notes, the experience of 
the United States is not so unique as some commentators have seemed to suggest.
Explanatory theories
 ere has been no shortage of explanatory theories about the fall in crime rates in the Unit-
ed States. Some point to increased incarceration rates, whilst others ascribe it to the boom-
ing economy. Some appeal to changing demographics, whilst others credit the increased 
access to legal abortion. e problem has been that these explanations (and the many oth-
ers) have not been examined systematically, though headline writers have enjoyed using the 
wide range of possible explanations. In short, the media have been able to cherry pick and 
place before their readers and viewers those explanations which are more likely to appeal to 
popular prejudices. In contrast, actual evidence is in short supply and this is the knowledge 
gap which Conklin, Levitt and Zimring address in their various ways. 
8Media interest
Levitt22 usefully presents a list (see Table 3) of the most frequently cited reasons for the 
crime decline cited in major newspapers over the period 1991-2001. Levitt explains that ‘the 
single most frequent explanation given is the innovative policing strategies put into place. 
 e crime decline is also frequently attributed to increased imprisonment, changes in the 
market for crack cocaine, the aging of the population, tougher gun control laws, the strong 
economy, and increases in the number of police.’23 
Table 3 Media explanations for the decline in crime in the 1990s, ranked by 
frequency of mentions
Explanation Number of mentions
Innovative policing strategies 52
Increased reliance on prisons 47
Changes in crack / other drug markets 33
Aging of the population 32
Tougher gun control laws 32
Strong economy 28
Increased number of police 26
All other explanations 34
Source: Based on a LexisNexis search of articles written about the national decline in crime in leading United States 
newspapers over the period 1991–2001.24 
Types of explanation
Before considering the evidence, it is useful to note the types of explanations which are 
seriously discussed by the three sets of commentators – Conklin,25 Levitt26 and Zimring.27 
In trying to answer the question: ‘Why did crime rates fall in the 1990s?’, Conklin focuses 
on the police, the prisons, drugs, firearms, age structure, institutions and community, while 
Zimring mainly considers the increase in incarceration rates, the decrease of young males as 
a percentage of the population, and the booming economy. Levitt considers ten factors and 
presents six commonly suggested and plausible theories – the strong economy of the 1990s; 
changing demographics; better policing strategies; gun control laws; laws allowing the car-
rying of concealed weapons; increased use of capital punishment – but he maintains that in 
practice they do not appear important in explaining the decline of crime rates. In contrast, 
he identifies four factors – increase in the number of police; the rising prison population; the 
receding crack epidemic; the legalisation of abortion – that he maintains explain the decline 
in crime.
Levitt also indicates the estimated contribution of various factors to the decline in crime in 
the 1990s. In addition, he shows what he calls the ‘certainty level of estimated impact’ giv-
ing his appraisal of how speculative the estimates are for each of the factors considered. In 
fact, focusing on homicide, violent crime and property crime, he considers the percentage 
change that each factor accounts for over the period 1991–2001. So, for example, there is a 
943% downward change in the UCR reported crime for homicide over the period 1991–2001. 
Levitt maintains that four factors – increases in the prison population, legalised abortion, 
increases in the number of police and the decline of crack – contribute 12%, 10%, 6% and 
5,5% respectively, and so adding cumulatively to 33,5% (with just 10% of the decrease 
‘unexplained’).
In terms of ‘certainty level of estimated impact’, Levitt places ‘increases in the prison popula-
tion’ in the HIGH certainty level, ‘increases in the number of police’ and ‘legalized abortion’ 
in the MEDIUM certainty level, and ‘the decline in crack’ in his LOW certainty level. Levitt’s 
careful accumulation of evidence about the various factors seems very impressive.
Conklin’s work had both an impact at the time and continues to get media coverage. 
Recently, in an article in Time magazine entitled ‘What’s behind America’s falling crime rate’, 
Von Drehle notes that, ‘In his book Why Crime Rates Fell … John Conklin concluded that up 
to half of the improvement was due to a single factor: more people in prison.’28 While there 
is a bit of media hyperbole, the statement does not fundamentally distort Conklin’s position. 
Conklin concludes that ‘on the basis of the evidence examined in this book, I believe that 
the rising rate of incarceration was probably the most important reason that crime rates fell 
a"er 1991.’29 is conclusion comes a"er a discursive examination of various other factors.30 
Conklin’s conclusion comes close to Levitt’s conclusion, except that Levitt strongly promotes 
his espousal of the importance of legalised abortion. e argument about the effect of 
legalised abortion made by Levitt states that the underlying theory essentially rests on two 
premises: unwanted children are at greater risk of crime, and legalised abortion leads to a 
reduction in the number of unwanted births.31 
In his book Conklin mentions Zimring’s earlier conversion to recognising the validity of the 
declining crime rates in the United States. In 1997 Zimring is cited as saying: ‘I have been 
a sceptic. But now, because of the length of the decline, its magnitude and the number of 
places it is occurring, I think I am experiencing a foxhole conversion.’32 Ten years later Zim-
ring published his book which, in effect, challenges an emerging consensus. 
Zimring stressed in his conclusions that his is ‘a book without a bottom line.’33 Nevertheless, 
he points to the combination of increased prison populations, a strong economy, and appro-
priate demographics as creating a very favourable condition for a decline in crime rates. e 
latter two elements are in contrast to Levitt, who argues that the economy and demographics 
make a negligible contribution. 
In terms of adjudicating between the various contributions of Conklin, Levitt and Zimring, 
Zimring begins to be the more convincing simply on account of his recourse to a compara-
tive analysis, which is methodologically interesting. Hence, Zimring finds that, although 
a historically high number of incarcerated persons and decreasing crime rates coincided 
during the 1990s in the United States, the same was not true for Canada, which experienced 
similar declines in crime rates. Canada’s prison population remained relatively stable, while 
the prison population in the United States grew significantly. In fact, by this type of analysis, 
Zimring systematically challenges other explanations so that he comes to the conclusion 
that no one explanation will be sufficient. To take another example: the booming economy 
explanation is seductive and Zimring certainly points to some empirical evidence to suggest 
there is a relationship between crime rates and economic growth. Curiously, however, while 
Canada experienced declines in the crime rate in the 1990s similar to the United States, 
Canada did not experience the same economic boom as the United States. In fact, Canada’s 
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unemployment rate was higher during the 1990s than it was during the 1980s when their 
crime rates increased. So perhaps – following Zimring – it is all much more complicated 
than these analysts sometimes seem to suggest.
Explaining the decline in the crime rates in the United States in the 1990s remains conten-
tious, but there are at least three points to stress. ese analyses of the falling crime rate in 
the US are important and are the type of issue which criminologists should be addressing. 
One needs to heed Zimring’s ‘euphoric fallacy’ – that is, ‘the urge to assume that declines 
are inevitably caused by human agencies’, and to note the dangers of ‘the more powerful 
the vested interests of criminal justice actors to see their efforts as a cause of the benefits of 
lower crime rates’.34 Hence, advocates of the supposed success of the police and prisons are 
difficult to resist. One needs to recognise the methodological shortcomings of some existing 
work. Zimring has pointed to the importance of considering comparative work. However, 
he also points to the dangers of relying on policy based on work derived from ‘some of the 
weaker statistical techniques associated with regression analyses over time’.35 Nevertheless, 
as Conklin36 notes, ‘it would be quite surprising if the imprisonment of half a million more 
prisoners in 1999 than in 1991 had not affected crime rates.’ We return to this issue in the 
next section.
Our next concern, however, is the remarkable contrast between the factors that were dis-
cussed in the first section of this paper – which focused on risk factors, such as those associ-
ated with social and family background, individual resources and so on – and the second 
section – which highlighted a rather different set of factors, including the importance of 
an increased prison population and an increase in the number of police officers. In other 
words, none of the commentators talking about the decline in the US crime rates speculates 
about improved child-rearing, that people are no longer living in disadvantaged areas or that 
people have accumulated more in individual resources which will help them to resist the 
temptation of crime. Such possibilities are not mentioned. 
 
Connections rather than conflict between the two traditions?
We now need to try to connect what seem to be two rather different sets of results emanat-
ing from the first two sections of the paper. To some extent they can also be identified as 
emanating from two separate traditions – one stems from a more ameliorative tradition of 
trying to make things better for offenders and potential offenders, while the other stems 
from a more social protection/social defence tradition which considers what society must 
do to protect itself from harm and potential harm. How can these two sets of results and two 
traditions be reconciled in some way?
Firstly, there are some important distinctions that need to be recognised from the outset. 
 e work outlined in the first section is at a micro-level focusing on individuals in a birth 
cohort. In contrast, the work outlined in the second section is more at the macro-level using 
aggregated rates. However, perhaps more importantly, there are very different constituencies 
being considered in the two types of analysis. Our work which we report on in section one 
focuses on the influences prior to the first conviction, while the work being reported upon in 
the second section largely focuses on crime in general where, as we shall see, the contribu-
tion of persistent offenders is crucial. Additionally, the first section focuses on those caught 
and prosecuted, whereas the second focuses on recorded crime, whether or not solved. 
 ese various constituencies need to be unpackaged and, using estimated figures from 
England and Wales as an exemplar, one needs to consider the numbers in each constituency. 
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In other countries the proportions may be different from this example, but the underlying 
principles will remain sacrosanct.
In a famous study in which around four hundred boys from an area in the south-east of 
London (England) were followed up from early childhood to the age of 50, Farrington and 
his colleagues37 found that 7% of the males in his series accounted for around half of all the 
convictions up to the age of 50. is finding has similarities with the estimate of Soothill 
et al38 that around 4,7% of the males aged 10 to 46 in the population had been ‘persistent 
offenders’ at some point in their lives.39 As Soothill et al40 stress elsewhere, this figure is not 
static and one can identify certain trends and patterns that characterise the body of ‘per-
sistent offenders’ in England and Wales. Age, however, is crucial: ‘Both male and female 
offenders41 who are first convicted at a young age are much more likely to become persistent 
offenders than their older counterparts. Hence, there is merit in trying to target young of-
fenders in attempting to break the offending cycle.’42 
In fact, in England and Wales there is much more good news about offenders than is gener-
ally recognised. If we consider official conviction data, persistence seems to be a fairly unu-
sual phenomenon, for most people seem to have only one court appearance. Indeed, of the 
11 068 convicted persons in the 1953 Home Office birth cohort, 50,2% of males and 74,3% of 
females have only one appearance resulting in a conviction.43 So, for most, one court appear-
ance is, thankfully, the end of the story in terms of appearing in the official crime statistics. 
However, some, mostly males – as we have already indicated – go on to appear on many 
occasions. Of those males convicted at least once in the 1953 cohort, 16,4% have a second 
court conviction but no more, while a further 22,5% have three or more.44 Of course, when 
one includes females – who have a lower proportion of convictions – the figures of recidi-
vists become lower.
Presenting the figures for England and Wales, one can therefore roughly say that out of every 
100 persons, the following is likely to take place.
Box 1 Types of conviction history for every 100 persons born in 1953 in 
England and Wales
67 persons – not convicted
17 persons – convicted once
5 persons – convicted twice 
8 persons – convicted three times
around 50% of all convictions
3 persons convicted four or more times } around 50% of all convictions
 e actual proportions are likely to vary from country to country, but the principles will 
remain the same. In confronting the figures presented in Box 1, there are at least three major 
tasks:
1 Making the group who are not convicted at all (currently around 67%) as large as pos-
sible. is is the issue of onset.
2 Making the group who are convicted (currently around 33% of the population) be 




3 Dealing with the group who are convicted on four or more occasions (around 3%45 of 
the persons who contribute around 50% of the total convictions). is is the issue of 
persistence.
 e general fallacy is to believe that these tasks can be addressed in the same way. In broad 
terms, the discourse relating to tasks (1) and (2) tends to focus on persons (that is, pre-
venting persons from becoming offenders), while the discourse relating to task (3) largely 
focuses on offences (that is, reducing the number of offences). In fact, while seemingly 
different, both sets of discourses are prevention discourses – the first discourse focuses on 
trying to reinforce acceptable behaviour and, where appropriate, to change people, while the 
second discourse focuses on how to respond to persons who refuse to behave acceptably. 
In theoretical terms, this distinction has been fully recognised in the development of the 
sociology of deviance. Edwin Lemert’s famous distinction between primary and secondary 
deviance46 is relevant. Lemert’s primary deviance relates to questions of why persons commit 
deviance in the first place, while secondary deviance relates to questions of how and why 
persons persist in deviance (that is, the movement from the first to the second court appear-
ance and, for some, a movement to subsequent convictions). 
Our recent work has focused on primary deviance and has revealed that there is a set of in-
fluences which are useful in promoting good behaviour and/or making young people more 
resilient to bad influences. e calculations in this work relate to the increased likelihood of 
preventing a first conviction. While most of the favourable influences are likely to be more 
beneficial ‘across the board’, that is, in preventing all types of crime, we have also demon-
strated that some of the influences are likely to be more beneficial in preventing some types 
of crime than others. In fact, in England and Wales, despite misgivings about the crime rate, 
we are remarkably successful in containing the crime problem. Seventeen out of 20 persons 
in the population will either have none or only one court appearance resulting in a convic-
tion for a standard-list offence.47 In other words, over four out of five persons contribute 
very little to the crime problem in England and Wales. While some youngsters (particularly 
males) may be troublesome for a while, they are not ‘the crime problem’. However, in con-
fronting ‘the crime problem’ in its initial stages, rather than proposing for more policing and 
more prisons to come into play, there is still scope for more normal positive influences, such 
as good parenting, good education and job opportunities, to be influential. 
 e interest for ‘liberal criminologists’ is to increase the proportion of the population who 
will have no or only one conviction. However, one needs to recognise that trying to get fewer 
to be convicted at all (that is, increasing the figure of 67% who are not currently convicted) 
is a very worthwhile goal, but presents a long-term effort. Changing social circumstances 
and improving life chances are not things that can be altered overnight. In short, the results 
and outcomes are likely to be generational rather than instant. 
An alternative approach – which is essentially what Conklin, Levitt and Zimring are em-
bracing – is to focus on how to deal with the 3 in 100 persons who at some stage in their 
lives are actively involved in crime (that is, those who have four or more convictions). ere 
are various ways of dealing with this ‘crime problem’, but there has largely been an emphasis 
on the social response to crime – how we police people, whether we imprison more peo-
ple and so on. e discourse is not about changing people, but about containing people – 
whether by increased police observation or by removing people from society. 
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Importantly, however, increased police observation and removing people from society 
are activities that can be altered overnight. e outcomes may be more immediate but the 
consequences may also be generational in the sense of adversely affecting the life chances of 
their children.
In short, it would be unwise to deny that implementing more draconian measures on certain 
targeted groups can have an impact. Targeted groups can be operative, because a compara-
tively low proportion of people commit a lot of crime. However, having said that, no one is 
all that skilled in predicting which of the persons convicted on, say, two occasions will go on 
to be reconvicted on several more occasions. In short, the curse of prediction is the likeli-
hood of false positives – that is, lots more persons are likely to end up in prison than need to 
on grounds of public protection. 
It is at this point that one needs to raise the issue of social cost. Again the recent article in 
Time magazine provides a vivid clue:
‘Increased sentencing in some communities has removed entire generations of 
young men from some minority communities,’ says San Francisco police chief 
George Gascón. ‘Has that been a factor in lowering crime? I think it probably has. 
I think it also probably has had a detrimental effect on those communities.48 
 e article goes on to vividly remind us that: 
Prison is expensive, demoralizing and deadening ... Prisoners leave saddened 
parents, abandoned mates, fatherless children. Of course, in many cases, those 
families are better off with their violent relatives behind bars. But a court system 
that clobbers first-time offenders with mandatory sentences – sometimes for non-
violent crimes – will inevitably lock up thousands of not-so-bad guys alongside 
the hardened criminals.49 
In short, the unintended consequences of imprisoning more and more people need to be 
both recognised and addressed. e social and economic costs are enormous – indeed, 
involving the next generation in a deleterious way, for many of the persons imprisoned have 
children who will suffer.
Wanting low crime rates is, of course, understandable, but the social cost of achieving that 
goal in a particular way must be taken into account. In fact, there is no doubt that one can 
manufacture low crime rates. Many totalitarian countries seem to have low crime rates, but 
living in such countries may be a high price to pay. What democratic countries, in contrast, 
should be hoping to achieve is a populace that exercises internal control (in other words, 
they want to conform). 
Wanting to conform means that people recognise that they have much to lose if they fail to 
conform. Social control theorists – a set of theorists not yet considered in this paper – have 
much to tell us about why persons might develop the option of choosing crime and devi-
ance. In fact, social control theory has long history. As Box50 pointed out, it was Hirschi51 
who first suggested, and found empirical support for, the argument that there are three 
elements in social bonding – attachment ( ‘a human being’s capacity to become affectively 
involved with another person and hence sensitive to his/her thoughts, feelings and expecta-
tions, particularly in regard to their relevance for his/her own behaviour’),52 commitment 
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(‘commitment refers to the rational element in the social bond. is concept enables us to 
make adequate allowance for the fact that most individuals do not persist in lines of activ-
ity unless there is something in it for them, even if that something is the negative reward of 
avoiding severe costs’)53 and beliefs (that is, ‘the human capacity to evaluate and take a stand 
on moral and social issues’).54 Hirschi’s point is that ‘if these fail to develop or are broken, 
then the individual has an option of choosing deviance’.55 Sadly, it seems evident that the 
social bonds of around three in 100 persons in England and Wales who together contribute 
around one-half of the total convictions have failed to develop or have been broken. Without 
any intervention in relation to this group the outcomes are clearly disastrous for society 
– that is, more crime. e intervention of incapacitation, among other things, may well 
produce results in terms of lower crime rates. However, this is a solution which produces 
permanent outcasts who must be locked up for long periods. e real failure with this group 
has been much earlier, that is, the failure to produce social bonding whereby internal rather 
than external control is operative. 
 e failure among criminologists such as Conklin, Levitt and Zimring is to recognise that 
criminals cover a wide range from those who have crossed the line for the first time to those 
who are hardened criminals. eir efforts have focused on social response issues such as 
policing and imprisonment, and pointed to ways of containing the problem of hardened 
criminals. However, their prescriptions are dire ones which rely principally on more external 
control, that is, more intrusive policing, more prisons, and so on. ey neglect the focus on 
helping persons to build up their own stake in society and, thus, develop internal controls 
whereby they can resist the temptation to commit crime. 
Finally, we wish to point to the most disappointing outcome of Zimring’s recent book. In 
his concluding chapter Zimring highlights ‘Seven lessons from the 1990s’. Lessons 1 to 6 are 
unexceptional. However, Lesson 7 needs to be challenged:
Lesson 7: Whatever else is now known about crime in America, the most important 
lesson of the 1990s was that major changes in rates of crime can happen without 
major changes in the social fabric
While indeed it may be true that one can achieve lower crime rates by massive investments 
in measures of external control – that is, by high incarceration rates (the United States has 
one of the highest incarceration rates in the world) and more intrusive policing – is this the 
way that one wants a society to develop? Is it desirable? Essentially this approach disen-
franchises a significant minority to penal waste bins and damages whole communities. e 
communities that are in trouble tend to have a vast range of other problems, such as health 
and housing, and it is myopic to see ‘the crime problem’ in isolation. 
In fact, we wish to endorse the WHO’s World report on violence and health56 – which espous-
es a public health approach to violence – and to widen it to crime in general. e crucial 
stance of a public health approach is to focus on prevention, that is, preventing diseases or 
illness from occurring rather than dealing with the health consequences. What this means is 
that a structural improvement in society will bring more gains (in crime, health and housing 





In summary, our message is a simple one. It is dangerous to ignore the issues raised in the 
first half of this paper. ey are principally directed at preventing persons becoming crimi-
nals in the first place. Failure to confront these issues will mean that there will continue to be 
more persons in the pool of offenders who might ‘graduate’ to becoming persistent offend-
ers. e pivotal issue is whether one can develop a society in which all persons feel that they 
have a stake and, thus, develop internal controls to resist crime. e development of more 
prisons and more intrusive policing is a sad measure of the failure to do this.
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